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Collective corruption - how to live with it: 
 Towards a projection theory of post-crisis corruption perpetuation 
 
Abstract 
This article draws on social psychology to explore the unconscious cognitive 
processes allowing for perpetuation of collective corruption in organisations in the 
aftermath of crises. In particular, we argue that, when faced with the cognitive 
dissonance produced by exposed collective corruption, and having to choose between 
changing behaviour or changing cognition, projection theory provides support for the 
latter. Thus, we identify the role of projection theory in overcoming cognitive 
dissonance in groups by projecting blame on to their leaders while continuing 
practices of corruption. These insights contribute to our understanding of perpetuation 
of collective corruption in organisations as well as at a societal level. 
 
Key words: collective corruption, collective, crisis, attributive projection, social 
psychology 
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Introduction 
This paper concerns the spread of corruption in organisations, following important 
insights provided, inter alia, by Zyglidopoulos & Fleming’s (2008), Greve and 
colleagues’ (2010) and Smith-Crowe & Warren’s (2014). However, it extends this 
body of work by tackling the ‘how’ question –how organisations engage in the 
vicious cycle between unravelling and perpetuation of corrupt behaviour. We suggest 
that, where conscious rationalisation processes fail to justify corrupt behaviour, 
another type of rationalisation processes intervenes -unconscious processes such as 
that of attributive projection. Indeed, like Gabriel (1992) and de Vries (2004) in this 
journal, we are ‘putting organisations on the analyst’s couch’, recognising that 
organisations can develop pathologies (like corruption –e.g. Gabriel 1992, Yolles and 
Fink 2013) just like individuals can. 
Unconscious dynamics, typically used to explain psychological pathologies of the 
individual within a clinical perspective, can be suitably argued to provide compelling 
explanations for plural agency (e.g. Yolles and Fink 2013 a, b, c). In this paper, we 
employ Yolles’s work on social cognitive processes (ibid.) and de Vries’s (2004) 
concept of social defences, in particular that of attributive projection, to understand 
how corruption is maintained in the aftermath of crises. Attributive projection is a 
defensive mechanism used by the collective to deal with the increased level of anxiety 
experienced in the face of a social crisis. The concept is used here in its Freudian 
sense: as a process through which a unitary or a collective agent attributes its 
unwanted thoughts and feelings to another unitary or a collective agent in an attempt 
to reduce or eliminate stress (Yolles, 2009). As such, it may act as a catalyst to 
accelerate the rate of change when this is necessary for the social collective to return 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 3 
to an acceptable psychological equilibrium. We illustrate this process through 
examples from the Romanian and Greek administrative contexts below. 
On the 30
th
 of October 2015, a fire blast in a Bucharest night club, Colectiv, leaves 64 
dead and 150 injured, but also prompts one of the most intense collective actions 
against a head of government in Europe. This collective action focuses on the 
overthrow of the individual leader - the prime minister - perceived to be linked to 
what is magnified to be a situation of endemic corruption throughout the Romanian 
administrative system. A few features are of particular interest in this case. First, the 
prime minister was never directly linked to the causes of this alleged systemic 
corruption. Secondly, the night club accident could only indirectly be related to the 
corruption in the health and safety regulatory system. Finally, the virulent anti-
corruption public drive ended almost immediately after the government fell. This is a 
vexing case, but far from unique. A similar case emerges from Greece: in April 2014, 
a random accident in the Happy Fun amusement park, caused by a sudden gash of 
wind, leads to the demise of an Athens municipality’s mayor. A child dies while 
inside an inflated plastic ball which has been thrown from a swimming pool onto a 
nearby busy road. The public would not rest until the mayor resigns on allegations of 
systemic corruption in the municipality, specifically relating to the fact that the 
amusement park has not passed the necessary health and safety checks, therefore 
operating without a licence. Like the Romanian prime minister, the Greek mayor 
could not be directly responsible for the accident, as corruption and unlicensed parks 
existed before his mandate and continue to exist after his demise. The two cases are 
intellectually challenging and thought provoking, as well as offering an opportunity to 
explore theoretically the links between collective and individual guilt when collective 
corruption is exposed. 
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Adopting a psychology perspective, we argue that groups engage in unconscious 
rationalisation processes, which are activated when facing cognitive dissonance, such 
as that experienced in the aftermath of a preventable crisis. Such events prompt 
reflection on the behaviour contributing to the crisis, as well as on the cognition about 
that behaviour. If the behaviour is so widespread and engrained into everyday life, 
such as corruption is in some cultures, it cannot be easily abandoned. Furthermore, 
not to change cognition over issues which are perceived to be normatively wrong 
(Torsello & Venard, 2016), like corruption, cannot be rationally justified. 
Unconscious cognition seems to be the only way forward to overcome cognitive 
dissonance and social psychology offers some insights into these unconscious 
processes. It is through such processes that we explain the perpetuation of corrupt 
behaviour in organisations and society at large. 
In order to theoretically engage with these issues, we proceed as follows. First, we 
narrate the Colectiv and Happy Fun Park cases, to set the scene and bring clarity to 
theoretical arguments made later in the paper. Then, we draw on theory to unpack the 
issues illustrated through the two cases. Within this, we explore the literature around 
corruption in individual and groups, we look at sense-making and scapegoating 
occurring in crisis aftermaths and we draw on social psychology theory to further 
illuminate the cognitive processes associated with the perpetuation of collective 
corruption. The analysis and discussion link these strands together, addressing the 
‘how’ question of corruption perpetuation. The implications are far reaching for both 
theory and practice and are expanded on in the concluding section. 
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The Colectiv Story  
This is a perplexing case: it appears to be about an accident causing massive loss of 
human lives (64) in a business setting, yet the accident is attributed to widespread 
corruption in a whole nation, and on these grounds, it is seen to have contributed 
directly to the overthrow of the government accused of corruption. 
Romanians had been well attuned to corruption cases well before 2012, when Victor 
Ponta, leader of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), became prime minister. In point 
of fact, Eurobarometer corruption attitude surveys have historically placed Romania 
at the top of European rankings in terms of the percentage of the population being 
aware of corruption taking place, as well as in terms of the percentage of the 
population being involved in corruption themselves (European Commission, 2014). It 
is therefore difficult to argue that Ponta was the cause of systemic corruption in 
Romania during the time the incident occurred. And yet there was something about 
the accident at Colectiv which seemed to tip the scale of public perception in that 
unlikely direction.  
Looking at the event at the centre of the crisis, that is, the fireworks accident causing 
the Colectiv nightclub to burn down during a rock concert, one can argue that it was 
produced through a number of failings. Notably, outdoors fireworks were used 
indoors, regulations around fire-retardant materials were not complied with, one of 
the two exit doors was closed, and the club admitted a much larger number of people 
than they were permitted (CCPM, 2015). Yet in the aftermath of the crisis, corruption 
was identified by the public as the central issue underpinning the accident (e.g. Dudau 
2015, Tran 2015). At close analysis, however, only one aspect of this case could be 
linked to corruption, concerning the fact that the nightclub in question had a health 
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and safety inspection on the very day of the fire and that the inspectors did not detect 
the wrong building material being used in the club’s ceiling (CCPM, 2015). 
Presumably, the inspectors failed to assess these issues due to a pre-existing 
relationship with the club owners marked by petty corruption (Dudau 2015). 
What followed the crisis was rather surprising. Heated accusations on all media 
channels, social media and on the streets of Bucharest reached alarming proportions. 
Corruption was at the heart of these accusations; if these started with night clubs’ 
owners and government inspectors, it soon extended, much like the fire in the 
Colectiv, to comprise all business owners and all government agencies (Dudau 2015). 
In a matter of days, the attention shifted from those directly engaged in petty 
corruption to Romanian prime-minister Victor Ponta. Spontaneous demonstrations 
filled the streets of all Romania’s major cities days after the fire to protest against 
systemic corruption at all levels of government, seen as having fallen into to a culture 
of financially motivated and contagious sloppiness (ibid.). Ponta, after all, had 
remained in power despite facing charges for fraud, tax evasion and money 
laundering (Tran 2015). On the back of these street movements, the government 
resigned on the 5
th
 of November 2015. The protests ended that day and, before long, 
public and political unrest settled (Ruscior 2015). 
While the story is complex and elements of it are unexpected, it has a few clear 
features which can serve as illustrations of our arguments in this paper. To start with, 
the overwhelming consequences of the accident undoubtedly provoked strong 
emotions amongst the ‘survivors’, who may not have been there in the Colectiv night 
club, but presumably felt that what happened there could have happened to them. 
These people felt like part of the same ‘collective’ as those who tragically died in the 
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Colectiv night club, not dissimilar to how people in organisations feel about sharing 
the same context. Then, the protests which followed suggest a misbalance between the 
social behaviour which allowed the accident to happen (i.e., wide-spread corruption) 
and people’s cognition around that behaviour (i.e., that this is wrong because it can 
cost human lives). Thirdly, the protests also suggested that the blame for the wrong-
doing was not theirs. While it was at first unclear who was at fault, it soon became the 
mayor, the government and the prime-minister. This is further evident in the fact that, 
once the prime-minister resigned, the social unrest ended (Ruscior, 2015). 
 
A further example: Happy Fun Park 
In like manner to the Colectiv case, the Happy Fun Park case provides another 
example of an isolated incident, alleged to be rooted in corruption. This, too, escalated 
into a crisis which eventually resulted into the demise of the mayor of the local 
municipality where the incident took place. 
Similar to Romania, Greece has an international reputation for corruption. In the latest 
Eurobarometer attitude survey (European Commission, 2014), 99 percent of the 
Greeks surveyed reported that corruption is widespread in their country, with bribery 
and the use of connections for personal gain being identified as the main expressions 
of corruption in national public institutions. Furthermore, 63 percent of Greeks report 
that they feel that they are personally affected in their daily lives by such corruption. 
It’s therefore fair to say that corruption is ever present in the Greek society in general, 
and at the Greek national and local government level in particular. What appears to 
warrant special attention is not corruption itself - which appears to have historically 
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 8 
corroding social relationships between the Greek state and its citizens - but rather, 
first, the extreme reaction to an isolated incident which came to be attributed to this 
corruption, and second, the even more extreme consequences of this reaction. 
The Happy Fun Park incident pertained to the death of a 13 year old boy and the 
serious injury of his 9 year old sister. On April 27th 2014, the two children had visited 
with their parents the local Happy Fun Park in Elliniko, a local authority situated in 
the immediate proximity of Athens. During the visit, the two children participated in 
an activity which involved walking on water in a pool inside large 6ft inflatable 
transparent plastic ‘zorb’ balls. An unexpected gush of wind reportedly threw these 
balls up high ten meters in the air and back down onto a busy nearby road, where the 
boy was hit by car (iefimerida.gr, 2014). Both children were eventually transferred to 
the Children’s Local District General Hospital Aglaia Kiriakou, where, according to 
sources, doctors made every effort to resuscitate the 13-year old boy, who later on the 
same day died from his head injuries. His 9-year old sister, suffered serious, but not 
life-threatening, internal injuries in her lungs, from which she was able to recover 
after spending a couple of weeks in intensive care (athensmagazine.gr, 2014). 
The day after the accident, police arrested two employees of the amusement park. 
Then, the licencing authorities conducted a review examining whether the site was 
authorised as compliant with all relevant safety regulations (athensmagazine.gr, 
2014). The review revealed that the company behind the amusement park had never 
applied or received licence for its operation. What is more, the inspection reports 
submitted by the company were shown to refer to other facilities in other locations 
and had in any case expired. When interviewed, Giannis Papadopoulos of the 
company responsible for the inspection of the facilities, admitted: 
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 9 
"The facilities at Elliniko were never tested by us. All 
inspection reports submitted by the company were for 
other facilities and have expired. What we had checked 
in Aspropyrgos was for different facilities than the ones 
in Elliniko... to be honest, I think it is totally 
irresponsible to operate any fun park game with winds 
over 50 miles per hour." (Giannis Papadopoulos, 
interview to enikos.gr) 
A week after the accident, the two employees in police custody, together with two 
company executives, were brought to court, where they were faced with charges of 
gross negligence and involuntary manslaughter.  
What followed these events was a public outrage, expressed both through social and 
through conventional media, focusing almost exclusively on the responsibilities of the 
mayor and the local city council: 
"The mere fact that a child died because the equipment 
was not inspected and safety rules were not adhered to, 
fills me with rage! How did the City Council and the 
local Police miss this? They need to explain and 
immediately brought to justice. They should be 
ashamed of themselves, all of them!” (Maria, post on 
enikos.gr, 2/5/2014) 
 
The Greek press also mirrored these sentiments in their first-page titles: "Great 
liability of the Mayor of Argyroupolis-Hellenic Chr. Kortzidis for the death of the 13-
year-old” (To Vima, 30/4/2014) and  “Shame! Amusement Park without Permit, 
Mayor without Consciousness” (Ethnos, 3/5/2014) 
Under extreme pressure from the people and the press, the Minister of Interior and 
Administrative Reconstruction, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, ordered an urgent independent 
review of the case, which was completed by the Board of Inspectors of Public 
Administration within five days and submitted to the Public Prosecutor's Office in 
Athens and to the Secretary General of Decentralized Administration of Attica 
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(alfavita.gr, 2014). Within less than two months, the Secretary General, Manolis 
Aggelakas, launched disciplinary action against the Mayor of Elliniko, who was asked 
to stand down from his position with immediate effect (iefimerida.gr, 2015). 
At first sight, the incident could be attributed to a number of different factors, varying 
from an unforeseen natural phenomenon (the gash of the wind), whose effect could 
have hardly been predicted, to the negligence or greed of the park’s owner who 
avoided payment for licencing, to the lack of monitoring mechanisms on the part of 
the City Council that should have known about the operation of an unlicensed 
amusement park in the area. None of these, however, could explain the public outrage 
targeting exclusively the mayor, the demonstrations in different parts on the city of 
Athens, the extraordinary high pace of damaging media reporting of unrelated aspects 
to the incident, as well as the relentless pressure by political analysts in traditional and 
digital outlets about the responsibilities of the mayor, who soon came to be seen as 
bearing sole responsibility for these events. 
 
Unpacking the issues… 
These events are quite extraordinary in that they offer an unlikely illustration of a 
phenomenon so far overlooked by the corruption literature: the role of emotion 
regulation in management of corruption as systemic pathology (Yolles and Fink 
2013a). In investigating how emotion regulation allows for the perpetuation of such 
social pathology, we also get an unlikely illustration of what happens to collective 
corruption when the top of a corrupt organisation or collective is removed –this is 
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important if we accept, as Smith-Crowe and Warren (2014) argue, that corruption is a 
top-down phenomenon. In the following sections we analyse these issues in turn. 
 
Corruption: of the individual and of the collective 
Corruption is one of those rare concepts which are as old as the world, widely debated 
in lay contexts, generally understood in scholarly circles, but which lack the fine 
graining required to meet its potential to cross-fertilise distinct and remote disciplines 
such as economics, psychology, anthropology, management, political studies, 
organisational studies and so on. Indeed our understanding of corruption, and of how 
people in organisations deal with it, is ever expanding. 
Definitions of corruption vary, but they have a few features at heart. One is the 
distinction between public and private good and the corruption of the former by the 
latter (Bratsis, 2003). This definition led some to believe that corruption can only 
really exist in the public sector (Lennerfors 2010). A more sector-neutral definition of 
corruption is ‘abuse of power’ (Zyglidopoulos, 2016), undertaken by directly bending 
the rules or changing the rules to make one’s unethical behaviour easier in the future. 
Zyglidopoulos refers to these as ‘first order’ and ‘second order’ corruption, with the 
latter being largely invisible, if far more dangerous. This is because it can lead to top-
down ‘collective’ corruption, initiated by top managers and politicians, people who 
have the resources and power to change the ‘rules of the game’ for personal gain.  
This aspect of corruption, the misuse of position for personal gain (Anand et al., 
2005), opens the debate around how such personal gain might be achieved: directly or 
indirectly. If direct benefits are well understood, indirect ones are slightly more 
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difficult to pin down, therefore less visible. This is why wider definitions of 
corruption have come to equate it with wrongdoing, not necessarily for direct personal 
gain, but through indirect benefits. The widest definition of corruption is that of 
‘impurity’ and it was put forward by Hindess (2001) reacting against dominant, yet 
narrow, economic perspectives on corruption (e.g., Rose-Ackerman 1999). Hindess’ 
(2001) definition is intriguing, because, first, it is devoid of economists’ normative 
stance on corruption (i.e., corruption is negative because it affects nations’ growth) 
and allows for more subtle interpretations, such as that corruption evaluations depend 
on standards of public life on which politicians, mass-media and public opinion 
disagree (Hindess 2001, Lamour 2011). Secondly, looking at corruption as to 
‘damaging impurity’ brings up the provocative thought that eradicating that which is 
impure has historically not always been the right approach and that it could be argued 
to be ‘not necessarily bad’ in as much as it forces systems to adapt and develop.  
Apart from conceptual clarity, the literature on corruption also suggests a shift in 
academic interest, from an individual level corruption to collective corruption. Indeed, 
the ‘bad apple’ theory of corruption resting on individuals being solely responsible for 
wrong doings has been counteracted in the literature by ‘bad barrels’ (Trevino & 
Youngblood, 1990) and ‘rotten orchards’ (Punch 2003)  approaches. If the ‘bad 
apples’ theory claims that individuals engage in corrupt activities independent from 
each other (Trevino & Youngblood, 1990), according to ‘bar barrels’ theory, groups 
are pushing otherwise ethical individuals to be corrupt (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). 
Punch (2003) then goes one step further suggesting, through his ‘bad orchard’ 
metaphor, that sometimes it is not the apple, nor the barrel, which are rotten, but the 
system in which these are embedded (Punch 2003). ‘Bad apples’ emerge from ‘bad 
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barrels’ and ‘rotten orchards’ as corruption is becoming normalised (Ashforth & 
Anand, 2003) in given contexts (Zyglidopoulos & Flemming, 2008).  
On the assumption that corruption is dynamic and suits a process, rather than a static, 
interpretation (Zyglidopoulos & Flemming, 2008; Smith-Crowe & Warren, 2014), 
Staub (1989) speaks of a ‘continuum of destructiveness’: the journey on which ethical 
individuals embark in lives in organisations and in society. Stations on this journey 
include, for example ‘innocent bystanders’, ‘innocent participants’, ‘active 
rationalisers’ and ‘guilty perpetrators’ roles (Zyglidopoulos & Flemming, 2008) 
which individuals assume from their first interaction with a corrupt system to 
becoming corrupt themselves. Zyglidopoulos and Flemming (2008) further maintain 
that this transition process is catalysed by ‘ethical distance’ of individuals from the 
outcomes of their actions. This underlines the tactics used in the army and in prisons, 
and is developed through infamous psychological experiments of people acting 
unethically when the objects of their actions are anonymous.  
This argument is similar to Moore’s (2008) and Bandura’s (Bandura et al. 1996) 
‘moral disengagement’ through which subordinates comply with line management 
requirements for immoral behaviour, or behaviour which would be considered 
immoral outside the boundaries of their organisation.  Neutral language often 
promoted in organisations as a measure of professionalism facilitates disengagement 
by sanitizing wrong-doing (see for example Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995; Tenbrunsel 
& Messik, 2004). In doing so, it facilitates transition first from ‘innocence’ to 
‘participation’ in collective corruption by having the wrong doing masked as 
‘business as usual’ and then from ‘participation’ to ‘rationalisation’ by learning to 
emulate the language to demonstrate belonging to the organisation and/or profession. 
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In terms of the relationship between individual and collective corruption, the latter is 
seen to be a ‘top-down practice’ (Smith-Crowe & Warren, 2014), where the leader’s 
corrupt practices descend upon its subordinates. When the leader did not themselves 
introduce the practice, but perhaps came to power on the back of such practices, and 
as a reward for excelling in them (see Staub’s (1989) ‘continuum of destructiveness’ 
and Ashforth & Anand’s (2003) institutional forces towards corruption), then an 
interesting phenomenon can be observed when the collective denounces collective 
corruption by removing the leader but perhaps not making sense of their own corrupt 
culture. In its treatment of ‘scapegoating’ and of the difference between latent and 
active errors in organisations, the literature on crisis management offers further 
insights on this issue. This will be followed by an explanation fostered by advances in 
social psychology. These distinct bodies of literature provide the opportunity for 
conceptual enrichment of corruption in organisations. 
 
The anatomy of a crisis 
The working definition of a crisis is that given by Smith (1990) to ‘operational crisis’ 
- a period of intense activity and confusion where ‘fire-fighting’ mechanisms are often 
employed in an attempt to recover as many organisational assets as possible. It also 
accepts wider interpretations in line with its Greek roots of ‘krisis’ identified by 
Antonacopoulou and Sheaffer (2014) to refer to ‘tensions that call for critical 
judgements, exercising critique, reflexivity, which would inform decisions reached 
and actions taken’ (pp.8).  
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Crisis aftermaths can provoke high emotional responses from the public due to the 
‘collision of the horrific with the ‘ordinary’ or ‘innocent’ status of the victim (Stanley 
& Manthorpe, 2004). Such emotional reactions can be explained by the ‘survivor’s 
syndrome’ concept developed by Menzies Lyth (1989). This is the ‘guilt’ felt by 
people for having been close to the accident without having noticed its incubation or 
who have noticed its incubation but could not prevent its escalation into a crisis. In 
this latter case, where there had been warning signs of the disaster and the process 
continued to a full-blown crisis, the guilt is exacerbated and the survivor needs a new 
identity and new ways of coping (Menzies Lyth, 1989). We argue that one way of 
coping is by attributing blame. This is normally to an individual or a group of 
individuals, which some literature refers to as ‘scapegoats’ (e.g. Smith, 1990). The 
main issue in scapegoating is that it prevents organisations to learn from crises (ibid.). 
What is less understood, however, in the crisis management literature, is the processes 
through which scapegoating becomes detrimental to learning from adversity. 
The intention, whether individual or collective, after a crisis, is supposedly to prevent 
similar ones in the future. This happens through organisational learning in the 
aftermath of crises occurs through sense-making (Weick, 1988), which is reliant on 
the analysis of both the trigger events of the crisis and, perhaps more importantly, the 
underlying conditions which enabled these to bypass organisational defences. These 
underlying conditions are normally cultural assumptions and organisational processes 
built on those assumptions (Schein, 1985; Mitroff et al., 1989; Smith, 1990; Turner, 
1976; Turner, 1978). Human error, normally visible through scapegoating in crises 
aftermaths, and often referred to as ‘the cause’ in popular media, is conceptualised to 
be little more than a trigger (Smith, 2006), the ‘active’ error enabling latent errors in 
organisations to escalate into a crisis (Reason, 1990). Active errors are easy to 
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identify, because they are visible, occur in a relatively short period of time and can be 
linked to one individual or a group. Denouncing the unsafe acts of such individuals 
however does little for effective learning from crises (Smith, 1990), we argue, as it 
shifts attention away from more enduring ‘latent’ errors. 
Deep learning, enabling change and indeed treating crises as opportunities for ‘safer’ 
organisations, are only possible if the invisible ‘resident pathogens’ or ‘latent’ errors 
(Reason, 1990) are identified and understood. The distinction between active and 
latent errors in the production of crises is similar to that between the ‘bad apples’ on 
the one hand, and ‘bad barrels’ (Trevino & Youngblood (1990) and ‘rotten orchards’ 
(Punch 2003) approaches to corruption on the other hand; indeed the last two 
metaphors depict corruption as based on more or less invisible institutional and social 
forces in organisations and groups fostering corrupt behaviour from otherwise ethical 
individuals (e.g., Ashforth & Anand, 2003). The difficulty of avoiding going down 
that path, in practice, has to do with cognitive difficulty to pinpoint that which is 
invisible. This is because the incubation of crisis emerges from the routine process of 
work: 
‘Many of those working within the organisation fail to 
see the significance of the ways in which they do things 
in terms of their impact on crisis generation; and the 
routine of the processes at work are often also invisible 
to those outside of the organisation due to lack of 
information.’ (Smith, 2005, p.312) 
This is how corruption becomes ‘normalised’ in organisations (Ashforth & Anand, 
2003). Vulnerability is therefore embedded in organisations, as deeply as their culture. 
It follows that people in organisations walk on ‘paths to vulnerability’ (Smith, 2000) 
without realising it. As people’s cognitive schema plays a central role in framing and 
interpreting events (Smith, 2005), sense making, i.e., noticing the early signs, is 
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problematic in organisations. Indeed, ‘people enact the environments which constrain 
them’ (Weick, 1988; Smith, 2000). The implication of that is that ‘disastrous events 
arise as by-products of normal functioning of larger managerial (…) systems’ 
(Turner, 1994). In other words, 
‘the regular processes of management, especially 
around decision making, generate the conditions in 
which controls are by-passed and the conditions for 
incubation are established.’ (Smith, 2005, p.11).  
Therefore, there is a difference between ‘reacting’ to a crisis event and ‘learning’ 
from the underpinning fractures which led to the crisis. The latter case rests on ‘sense-
making’ processes (Weick, 1988) leading to deep learning and cultural change 
(Turner, 1978). In the examples discussed earlier in this paper, the overthrow of the 
leader (of the government, of the local council) may seem like ‘reacting’ to crisis, 
given the narrow time span in which this occurred after the accidents. However the 
leaders had little to do with the actual events. Instead, the public saw their leaders as 
representative of the underlying conditions of the crisis, the endemic corruption in the 
‘collective’. Yet the fact that the blame was placed on an individual (the prime 
minister, the mayor) and their closest allies presents this as a case of ‘scapegoating’. 
Could this be one of Menzies Lyth’s strategies to cope with the ‘survivor’s guilt’ felt 
in the wake of massive loss of young human life at Colectiv or the loss of a child’s life 
at Happy Fun Park? If the blame placed on the individual shifted away from the 
collective and if that blame was for corruption, then ‘collective guilt’ is likely to 
accompany ‘collective corruption’. It then follows that, seemingly, survivor’s guilt for 
collective corruption has been addressed via scapegoating of one individual. If 
scapegoating prevents learning from crises, has learning from collective corruption, 
the underlying condition of the crisis, been short-circuited on this occasion? The next 
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section present an account of the cognitive processes through which that might have 
happened. 
 
Projection theory: between dissonance and balance in social cognition  
A social collective is defined as a structured collection of individuals among which 
has arisen a normative mind, seated in the noumen, and which operates in a way that 
may be distinct from that of the individuals that make it up. According to Yolles 
(2009), more or less coherent social collectives, like countries and enterprises, form 
durable structures and develop behaviour by virtue of the noumenal and existential 
attributes that they have. They are assumed to have a ‘collective mind’, which allows 
the social collective to behave as a singular cognitive entity. These ‘plural actors’, just 
like unitary actors (e.g., Fink and Yolles 2015), are subject to psychology mechanisms 
and conditions that are comparable to those of people and develop feelings such as 
anxiety, frustration and guilt. They then adopt collective psychological defences to 
deal with such feelings. These psychological conditions and subsequent responses are 
seen to be emerging at a lower level, by more elementary influences that arise from 
the collective’s participating groups or individual participants. In this sense, there is a 
broad relationship between the social psychology of the collective and the psychology 
of the individuals who compose it; as well as a pathology that leads to forms of 
abnormalities and dysfunctions that affect the way in which the collective functions as 
a whole, again similar to that of the individual (Yolles, 2009; Yolles and Fink, 2013a, 
b, c; Fink and Yolles, 2015). Pathologies are important to detect and understand in 
organisations because they lead to poor performance through poor management, 
procedures, communications and poor development of aspirations and motivation 
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(Yolles & Fink, 2013a). These have a strong connection with emotions which are 
found to impact on efficacy (idem., Fink and Yolles, 2015; Gross, 2008). 
In terms of how the ‘collective’ reacted after the two crises described earlier in this 
paper, the emotional reaction of the public in those aftermaths (e.g. Stanley & 
Manthorpe, 2004, Menzies Lyth 1989) could be explained through cognitive 
dissonance. This is the psychological state of stress or discomfort experienced when 
one holds two or more contradictory beliefs, ideas, or values at the same time; 
performs an action that is contradictory to one or more beliefs, ideas or values; or is 
confronted by new information that conflicts with existing beliefs, ideas, or values 
(Festinger, 1962). According to mainstream psychoanalytic theory, when 
experiencing a state of dissonance, a unitary (and, by extension, a collective) agent 
will be motivated to reduce this dissonance by (a) changing behaviour, (b) changing 
cognition, or (c) selectively acquiring new information or opinions which would allow 
to align the two. Such corrections are seen to allow the agent to establish - and re-
establish, when necessary - psychological balance, and maintain prima facie 
contradicting values and behaviours over time (Heider, 1960). 
Take the example of a citizen or a member of an organisation expressing the belief 
that corruption is an unacceptable and ethically reprehensible act; they can still 
engage in corrupt behaviour by either altering thoughts about the inevitability of 
corruption (e.g., has there ever been a society without corruption?); or by introducing 
new information about its extent (e.g., everybody at some point will inevitably engage 
in some form of corrupt behaviour) or its effect (e.g., corruption at the lower levels of 
society does not have the same impact as corruption at the top level of society). 
Previous literature has categorised such psychological defence mechanisms as 
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compartmentalisation (McWilliams, 2011), typically used to alleviate the mental 
discomfort and anxiety caused by a person's holding conflicting values, cognitions, 
emotions and beliefs. Compartmentalisation facilitates ‘doublethink’, essentially 
allowing conflicting cognitions and behaviours to co-exist by inhibiting direct or 
explicit acknowledgement and interaction between separate compartmentalized self-
states (Leary & Tangney, 2011). Under normal conditions, such rationalisations allow 
the (unitary or collective) agent to reduce cognitive dissonance while continuing to 
exhibit the behaviour that is inconsistent with his values. 
Whether, however, such conscious psychological defence mechanisms can be 
effective under more extreme circumstances is debatable. Occasionally, events 
emerge in the face of which the information and subsequent cognitions produced are 
so unambiguous (e.g. the catastrophic outcomes of a crises, marked by massive and 
entirely avoidable loss of human life) that successful rationalisation is not possible for 
the agent. An alternative might be changing the behaviour; yet both corruption and 
crisis management bodies of research suggest that latent behaviour such as collective 
corruption is normalised to such an extent, that it cannot be reversed through 
rationalisation, and it cannot be changed at once any more than organisational culture 
can. In such cases, the individual (or the public) may need to resort to alternative and 
more or less unconscious defence mechanisms aimed at reducing dissonance and at 
returning to a state of psychological balance. One of these mechanisms is that of 
attributive projection. 
One of the core psychological defence mechanisms employed by both a unitary and a 
collective agent (hence both by individuals and groups) is the ability to cognitively 
project. According to Freud (1950), projection (more formally termed as ‘attributive 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 21 
projection’), refers to the process through which an agent defends himself against his 
own unpleasant impulses or behaviour by denying their existence while attributing 
them to others. Similarly, Jung (1978) recognises projection as the process in which a 
perceived personal inferiority is recognised as a perceived moral deficiency in 
someone else. In projection, thoughts, motivations, desires and feelings that cannot be 
accepted as one's own are essentially dealt with by being placed onto the outside 
world and attributed to an external agent. This does not happen arbitrarily, but 
typically seizes on, and exaggerates, an element that already exists on a small scale in 
the agent to which the element is attributed (Freud, 1979), and tends to happen more 
at times of crisis, personal or political (Erikson, 1993). Projection, however, insulates 
and harms the agent who employs it, acting as a constantly thickening veil of illusion 
between the agent and the real world (Jung, 1969). 
De Vries (2004) maintains that projection as a psychological defence mechanism can 
be observed in social collectives such as an organisation, or a department within an 
organisation, when members of these groups collectively deny or reject (and thus 
alter) an uncomfortable experience by imagining that it belongs to another group, 
thereby finding a way to deal - or, more accurately, to not deal - with unwanted 
feelings or thoughts with which they associate that experience.  
A few aspects appear to be of utmost interest for the arguments put forward in this 
paper: that blame is projected onto a perceived ‘other’, in other words onto someone 
who is being regarded by the ‘group’ as out-group; that this projection exaggerates 
blame, rather than ‘creating’ it; that this unconscious process occurs more at time of 
crisis; and, finally, that in the longer term, although a coping mechanism, it is 
detrimental to the group involved in projection.  
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Analysis and discussion 
The theory proposed in this paper is of corruption perpetuation in organisations due to 
attributive projection. The tenets of this proposition maintain that, despite the 
normalisation of corruption in certain contexts, cognitive dissonance occurs at times 
of crisis but then quickly subsides due to the powerful forces of attributive projection.  
In the absence of projection, cognitive dissonance would represent a real opportunity 
for behavioural change, however projecting the blame onto someone else is an 
unconscious mechanism which allows for restoration of balance in social cognition, 
allowing the -corrupt- behaviour to continue. This is particularly applicable to 
corruption due to its perception as normatively wrong (Torsello & Venard, 2014) -
since projection theory is a defence mechanism of behaviour which is perceived to be 
wrong. It is also applicable to crises, because the theory entails exaggeration (Freud, 
1979) of someone’s moral deficiency (the person onto whom guilt is projected) –so 
the demised leaders are likely to bear at least some of the blame- which happens more 
in times of crises (Erikson, 1993). 
At first glance, the Colectiv and the Happy Fun Park cases appeared to be quite 
vexing: an accidental fire blast in a night club, and an accident in an amusement park, 
respectively, are attributed to systemic corruption causing emotionally-motivated 
public unrest which only settles with the overthrowing of the heads of the national, 
and of the local administrative systems, respectively. We have taken the opportunity 
of such puzzling yet not unusual cases, to interrogate our current understanding of 
corruption, and to draw implications for management and organisations. In doing so, 
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we resorted to theoretical lenses from social psychology and crisis management, 
reaching a possible explanation of perpetuation of corruption in organisations. 
Indeed, the literature on corruption suggests that, despite being regarded as 
normatively wrong (Torsello & Venard, 2014), corrupt behaviour can be normalised 
(e.g., Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2008) to such an extent, that it becomes accepted in 
organisations. Given the overwhelmingly widespread corruption revealed by the 
results of the Eurobarometer survey (EU Commission 2014) in Romania and Greece, 
corruption appears to be endemic in the society and its organisations. While we do not 
have data about the process through which this has come to be the case, we assume 
Anande’s (2005) rationalisation processes to have led to the normalisation of corrupt 
behaviour (Zyglidopoulos and Freming, 2008). The Colectiv and Happy Fun Park 
accidents then pushed members of these administrative contexts to face the 
consequence of this normalisation, arguably exposing the limits of those 
rationalisation practices. The sheer sense of tragedy created a sense of collective 
anxiety which then arguably prompted de Vries’s (2004) social processes such as 
projection theory, largely unconscious and directed at achieving emotional balance in 
the collective. On this basis we argue that, when crises such as these bring conscious 
cognition processes (such as corruption rationalisation) to a halt, unconscious 
processes (such as attributive projection) take over.  
Crises are often said to provide learning opportunities in organisations (e.g., 
Antonacopoulou & Sheaffer, 2014) and such opportunities are linked with sense-
making which follows man-made disasters (e.g. Weick, 1988), emerging from a social 
instinct of prevention. However, we argue that these sense-making processes go 
against other, perhaps more powerful ones, of projection. The latter explain how, 
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when a crisis tips collective consciousness out of balance, the collective projects guilt 
on their leader in order to return to a state of equilibrium. This then can allow for 
further rationalisation processes (as shown by Anand, Ashforth & Joshi, 2005). In 
doing so, groups engage with Staub’s ‘continuum of destructiveness’ (1989): they 
continue corrupt behaviour, essentially perpetuating corruption.  
These observations apply to social groups at any level - i.e. of an organisation as well 
as a nation- where collective dynamics is possible. Although the cognitive processes 
discussed in this paper were originally conceptualised at the level of individual 
psychologies (e.g., Freud, 1979), they were later adopted by social psychology (e.g., 
de Vries, 2004, Yolles 2009), where plural agency is seen as comprised of numerous 
individual agencies (e.g., Fink and Yolles 2015).  
Social psychology lenses allowed us to explore what happens when conscious 
processes of corruption rationalisation face the test of a crisis to which they have 
contributed. Such adverse events exacerbate people’s cognitive dissonance, offering 
the opportunity to learn and reverse cultural and procedural crisis incubators –that is 
the cultural determinants of corruption and the processes which may have come to 
encourage it. However, as attributive projection theory maintains, such opportunity is 
by-passed by the powerful and largely unconscious forces which neutralise the 
dissonance between behaviour and cognition by projecting it elsewhere, for example 
on an individual. What we imply is therefore that, often, the collective is nominally 
unaware of being corrupt. This may, at first glance, seem to contradict Anand, 
Ashforth and Joshi’s (2005) thesis that corrupt collectives are generally aware that 
they are normatively in the wrong. What we actually argue is that the collective is 
using the rationalisation tactics described by Anand, Ashforth and Joshi (2005) to 
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such an extent, that the ‘original sin’ covered by these tactics, becomes invisible, or 
unconscious. Crises take these processes even further when the normative wrong 
behaviour rationalised to stages of denial simply get attributed to a scapegoat, 
bringing cognitive and emotional balance to the collective. Once this balance has been 
restored, corruption can continue in the collective. There is a real paucity of research 
on emotional regulation in management of systemic pathology (such as in 
organisations and societies) and this paper speaks to this neglected area of research. 
Moreover, it answers, however secondarily, a further question left ambiguous in the 
literature: if organisational leaders influence, either directly or indirectly, corrupt 
(Ashforth & Anand, 2003) and unethical behaviour (Schaubroeck et al., 2012), 
through either first-order or second-order corruption (Zyglidopoulos, 2016); if, like 
Smith-Crowe and Warren  (2014) argue, collective corruption is a top-down process; 
what happens when the leader is removed: does the corruption they engendered 
continue, or does it stop? Our study of attributive projection in collective corruption 
suggests that it continues. 
 
Final reflections on theoretical and management implications 
We developed our argument by cross-fertilising existing research on corruption with 
concepts developed in social psychology. Indeed, we have found this discipline to be 
extraordinarily useful to conceptualising cognitive processes in which individuals and 
collectives engage contributing to the perpetuation of corruption in organisations. To 
start with, it is a robust theory which passed the test of time and has found 
applications in numerous fields relying on human cognition, including education and 
psychiatry. As the study of corruption advanced to include process theories explaining 
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the development of corruption through processes of rationalisation (Anand et al., 
2005) seen by some to be prompted by emotions (Smith-Crowe & Warren, 2014), the 
field appears to be ready to adopt frameworks of cognition. Future research could 
make further use of social psychology and empirical investigations could inform such 
research.  
In terms of theory, our choice of attributive projection is not the only one through 
which corruption perpetuation could be explored - other theoretical frameworks refer 
to dissonance reduction strategies such as those we describe in this paper (such as 
believing in the inevitability of corruption, minimizing its impact, or 
compartmentalizing self-states): Hirschhorn’s (1990) splitting, projection and 
introjection, Piaget’s (1950) operational and figurative intelligence, subjection theory 
(Lacan 1976, Roberts 2015), pluralistic ignorance (Miller and Macfarlane, 1991), 
moral disengagement (Bandurra et al. 1996), social identity and self-categorization 
theories (Hogg and Terry 2000). However, they do not go far enough in explaining 
the social processes which occur during and immediately after crises, particularly 
around scapegoating, which is what our examples in this paper so poignantly 
described and on which the authors focused their reflection on corruption perpetuation 
in large collectives.  
The practical implications of theory for management are complex. A projection theory 
of corruption perpetuation does not paint an optimistic picture, therefore it is hardly 
conducive to action. While suggestions for managerial practice need to be made with 
caution, one central implication of our theory is that, at the corporate governance 
level, boards of directors faced with organisational crisis as a result of corruption 
exposure should be aware that removing the leader does not suffice in eradicating 
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corruption in organisations. This is because scapegoating effectively enables the 
perpetuation of collective corruption. This is not hard to imagine in the aftermath of 
successive episodes of unethical behaviour in organisations such as the RBS (Royal 
Bank of Scotland) which has known two CEO changes in the past seven years, with 
little impact on the ‘blamed’ practice of bonus giving for under-performance.  
Predictions, rather than suggestions, may be easier to put forward on the basis of our 
arguments in this paper. To start with, the theory underlines that there are limits to 
conscious rationalisation of corruption behaviour. In organisational corruption, where 
corrupt behaviour is in line with organisational goals, we suggest that, even if this 
process is top-down, when the leader is removed, corruption is likely to continue.  
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